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Of all the characters in European literature, that of Satan is perhaps
the most problematic. He is evil personified; rebellious and proud,
powerful and impotent, deceiver and deceived. Any writer
attempting to portray his revolt as a meaningful threat to God's rule
runs a very serious risk of downplaying the omnipotence of the
deity himself, and of falling rapidly into religious (that is: ethical)
dualism. This article seeks to examine the dark side in two such epic
poems from two different ages and religious traditions, taking a
comparative approach in the hope of shedding some light on two
ostensibly similar stories.
Despite the accusation of a number of critics that Njegos's Luc"a
Mikrokozma ('The Ray of the Microcosm') is simply an
unoriginal imitation of John Milton's Paradise Lost,l what one
finds in the Luc"a is not 'Milton-with-a-gusle',2 but rather a highly
original Montenegrin poet, owing debts to no one and everyone,
and conveying a systematic3 - albeit confusing - religious dualism
more akin to Origenism, Bogomilism, or German Idealism, than to a
slightly heretical seventeenth-century Puritan. Taking a comparative
approach to these two poems reveals the uniqueness of Njegos's
style and of his methods of adapting existing ideas and motifs to his
religious philosophy, which is quintessentially Slavic rather than
occidental in its preoccupations and influences. It also reveals a
rarely discussed side of Milton, and highlights his creative responses
to the age-old problem of evil.
1 This view has been argued by such critics as Svetislav Vulovic, Petr Alekseevich
Lavrov, Jasa Prodanovic, Milan Resetar and Jovan Skerlic. Noted in Milovan
Djilas, Njegos: Poet, Prince, Bishop, trans. Michael B. Petrovich, (New York,
1966) p266. Unfortunately, none of the works mentioned are available in English.
2 A gusle is a one-stringed fiddle, with which most Yugoslav epic poetry is
accompanied. Harry Levin, 'Preface', in Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales,
(Cambridge, Mass., 2000) p xxxii.
3 Despite suggestions by such scholars as Prvulovic that 'strictly speaking, there
is no system of thought in Njegos' (Zika Rad. Prvulovic, 'Njegos's Dialectical
Idealism, ' Journal of Theological Studies, 7 (1) 1956, p59), it is assumed in this
essay, following Djilas, op cit, p298, that Njegos's religious philosophy is at
least consistent and can therefore be treated as if it were a system.
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Influences on Njegos
The fundamental problem encountered when one first begins to
search for influences on the poetry of Petar Petrovic Njegos
(c.1813-1851) is that it is extremely difficult to know what he read,
as not only was much of his library and correspondence destroyed,
but the surviving library has seen so many additions that it is not
possible to know which books actually belonged to our poet. 1
Njegos was largely self-educated, and, in addition to his native
Serbo-Croatian, he spoke Russian, French and Italian, with a slight
knowledge of German.2 Although Njegos's own copy has been lost,
he read Milton either in French3 or in Russian;4 his Notebooks
reveal a close knowledge of Lamartine, Victor Hugo, Homer, and
the Tale of the Host of /gor;5 and from his dedication in the Luc"a,
he undoubtedly also knew the poetry of the 'Serbian singer, ' his
tutor Sima Milutinovic-Sarajlija.6 Beyond this, few links can be
established with certainty between Njegos and other textual sources,
although few would dispute that he at least also knew Plato, Origen,
Dante, Gundulic, Mazuranic, and the Slovak writer, L'udevit Stur, to
whom he addressed some of his verse.? His knowledge of Serbian
history is excellent; that of the natural sciences was fairly limited;8
and his role as bishop would have required a reasonable
understanding of Christian doctrine and liturgy. Most historians
assume that he knew of recent philosophical developments only
through general textbooks, as well as from journals such as the
Srbski narodni list, to which he himself contributed.9 Savic-Rebac
has maintained convincingly, however, that many of Njegos's ideas
came to him through oral sources and folk traditions, and as such
cannot be linked to any particular text. IO John Shawcross suggests
that
1 Anica Savic-Rebac, 'Introduction, ' Harvard Slavic Studies, 3, 1957, p114.
2 Djilas, op cit, pp45-6.
3 Savic-Rebac, op cit, p114.
4 Vera Javarek, 'Petar Petrovic Njegos (1813-1851)', Seer, 30 (75), 1952, p316.
5 Djilas, op cit, p46.
6 Petar Petrovic Njegos, The Ray of the Microcosm, 1-2, trans. Anica Savic-Rebac,
Harvard Slavic Studies, 3, 1957, p15!.
? Savic-Rebac, op cit, pl10.
8 Djilas, op cit, pp46-7.
9 Ibid, p271.
10 Savic-Rebac, op cit, pp117, 124, 126, and especially ppI42-3.
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there are two basic ways to approach literary debts: one external
through allusions and demonstrable knowledge of one author by
another, and one internal through verbal, contextual, or
structural reminiscences, if not downright quotation or
adaptation. 1
Njegos very rarely alludes directly to other writers by name,2 and
generally uses iqeas rather than specific motifs taken from earlier
works, always giving his own spin to any given idea, at times
rendering it almost unidentifiable. Despite this difficulty, it is
Njegos's intellectual borrowings that will most concern us here as it
is here that he is at his most original and most exciting. Each of his
ideas can be found in numerous sources, however, making it
impossible to pinpoint one source for any particular concept.
Verbal reminiscences are also difficult because of the problem of
translation; even the most direct quote can be unrecognizable when
translated from English to Russian to Serbo-Croatian.
So, it is structural reminiscences which provide the most easily
accessible means of locating Njegos's influences, although these too
are confused and idiosyncratic. The narrative of the poem takes the
form of the soul's journey to heaven with the help of a spirit-guide:
the ray of flame immortal; ... [through whom] thou rememberest
still what thou hast lost.3
The most obvious allusion here is to Dante's Paradiso where
Beatrice guides Dante through ten heavens to the throne-room of
God, just as Njegos's ray, and then his guardian angel, takes him
through seven heavens until they reach the 'region of light',4 where
he sees the 'throne sustaining mount',5 which almost resembles
Dante's 'rose',6 except that it is composed of rubies and adamant
rather than the thrones of saints, and consequently probably owes
1 John T. Shawcross, John Milton and Influence: Presence in Literature, History
and Culture, (Pittsburgh, 1991) pS.
2 The only exceptions in the Lucva are Sarajlija (1-2, 165), Pythagoras and Epicurus
(137).
3 Njegos, op cit, 1.214-216, pI57.
4 Ibid, 11.495, pI64.
5lbid, 11.571-580, p166.
6 Dante, Paradiso, Cantos XXX-XXXIII, trans. Mark Musa, (Bloomington, 1984)
pp352-94.
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more to the popular motif of the sacred mountain, found in
religious traditions worldwide,l than to Dante's vision.
However, the Paradiso is far from being the only literary
example of a spirit-journey to heaven. Particularly notable
alternatives that Njegos is likely to have known include the
Revelation of St. John where the apostle is taken to heaven with an
angelic guide and given a revelation of past and future events;2 and
the Celestial Hierarchies of pseudo-Dionysius, upon whom Dante
based much of his structure.3 Another highly significant alternative
is the first-century Gnostic text, The Vision of Isaiah, popular with
the Bogomils of medieval Serbia, in which Isaiah is taken through
seven heavens by an angel and shown the angels' war with Satan.4
Njegos and Milton
While these texts provide structural reminiscences for Cantos I and
11 of the Luca, they contain nothing like the narrative of the Fall
contained in Cantos Ill-VI, and here Njegos clearly looks to John
Milton for inspiration. Both poets begin at a point chronologically
late in the narrative and use visions and retellings to relate earlier
events.5 Both relate a similar narrative based on Genesis 1-3 and
Revelation 12:7-9, although Milton places much more emphasis on
the Garden of Eden story than does Njegos. Both also work within
the tradition of the 'Christian epic' and display all its conventions: a
cosmic scope, long speeches, a great battle, and a salvific action
dependent upon submission to the divine will. This epic tradition,
which in its pagan form can be traced back to Homer and Virgil,
usually contains, according to Joseph Campbell, a cyclical formula,
in which
a hero ventures forth form the world of common day into a
region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there
encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back
1 For a general overview of the sacred mountain motif, see Mircea Eliade, Cosmos
and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask, (New York
1959) ppI2-17.
2 Revelation 1:9-13, 4: 1-6. All biblical citations and quotations are taken from
The Holy Bible: New International Version, (New Jersey, 1978).
3 Mother Alexandra, The Holy Angels, (Minneapolis, 1987) p155.
4 Reprinted and translated in Waiter L. Wakefield and Austin P. Evans, Heresies of
the High Middle Ages, (New York, 1991) pp449-58.
5 Javarek, op cit, p520.
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from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons
on his fellow man. I
This formula is much clearer in Njegos than in Milton, but certainly
places the Luca in the epic tradition of which Milton was also a part.
Important too is the use that both make of traditional models.
Demaray argues that Milton was revolutionary in his merging of
traditional iconographic typology, based on Biblical and pilgrimage
models, with 'original methods of empirical depiction learned from
the literature of discovery' .2 Milton abandons medieval models not
only in his use of geography and journeys, as Demaray
demonstrates, but also by his introduction of original theological
speculation, passing beyond established theology with his emphases
on Arminianism,3 the annihilation of evil,4 and some heretical
angelology.5 Milton's boldness is imitated by Njegos whose
purpose in writing the Luc"a is more the exposition of his own
metaphysical speculations than the traditional purpose of the
Christian epic, which was to provide an imitation of an action noble,
great and perfect, narrated in the loftiest verse, with the aim of
giving profit through delight,6 although this traditional purpose is
also present in his poem.
If both use and abuse traditional structures and models in their
poetry, then Njegos and Milton also utilize similar poetic
techniques, having 'a striking similarity of tone and· sense'.7
although not to an extent that could suggest a reliance of one upon
the other. Both use a ten-syllable formula, but while Milton's verse
is in iambic pentameter, Njegos uses the trochaic pentameter typical
of Yugoslav folk ballads.8 Yet even here Njegos asserts his
1 Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, (1949); quoted in Zdenko
Zlatar, The Slavic Epic: Gundulic's Osman, (New York, 1995), p290.
2 John G. Demaray, Cosmos and Epic Representation: Dante, Spenser, Milton and
the Transformation of Renaissance Heroic Poetry, (Pittsburgh, 1991) pp6, 183.
3 Dennis Richard Danielson, Milton's Good God: A Study in Literary Theodicy,
(Cambridge, 1982) p82.
4 Leonora Leet Brodwin, 'The Dissolution of Satan in Paradise Lost: A Study of
Milton's Heretical Eschatology, ' in lames D. Simmonds (ed.), Milton Studies VIII,
(Pittsburgh, 1975) p166.
5 Robert H. West, Milton and the Angels, (Athens, Georgia, 1955) ppI62-7.
6 Torquato Tasso, Discourses on the Heroic Poem, [1594], p14; quoted in Zdenko
Zlatar, Slavic Epic, p136.
7 Javarek, op cit, p521.
8 Ibid, p520.
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individuality, frequently placing the stress on the ninth syllable,
whereas decasyllabic line trochaic meters usually predominate in the
folk tradition. The effect of this is that the Luca is far more
amenable to recitation than to singing,] suggesting that Njegos
ought to be considered a literary rather than an oral poet. Albert
Lord argues that Njegos was psychologically out of the oral
tradition of composition and, as such, uses unique formulas and
lines rather than relying on the multiform patterns of traditional
singers.2 This brings him closer to Milton than to the folk tradition
with which he was familiar.
For the primary characters in his drama, however, Njegos looks
to his Montenegrin roots rather than to Milton, in whose narrative
Raphael and Uriel play dominant roles, possibly due to Milton's
unusual interest in the book of Tobit. 3 As is typical of Orthodox
angelology, Njegos relies completely upon Michael and Gabriel,
who were equal in rank to Satan before his fall,4 to act as the
opposites of Satan, rather than placing Christ himself in this role.
This is a defining feature of Bogomilism,5 one of the many
traditions that appear to have influenced Njegos. Eve is also very
prominent in Milton's narrative, while Njegos, once again revealing
a Bogomil influence, which was very negative towards the feminine,
reproduction and fornication, accords her a mere two Iines.6
Justifying Satan
1 Djilas, op cit, p330.
2 Lord, op cit, ppI32-133.
3 This unusual interest of Milton's is possibly also the reason for his replacing
Gabriel with Raphael as the Hermes-like messenger to mankind. See Beverley
Sherry, 'Milton's Raphael and the Legend of Tobias' Journal of English and
Germanic Philology, 1979, pp78, 230.
4 Njegos, op cit, 111.906, p175. For more on this convention in Orthodox
angelology see Cyril Mango, Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome, (London, 1980)
p154.
5 Zdenko Zlatar, 'Archangel Michael and the Dragon: Slavic Apocrypha,
Bogomilism, and Dualist Cosmology in the Medieval Balkans' Encyclopedia
moderna, 2 (38), 1992, p267.
6 On Bogomil attitudes toward the feminine and the corporeal, see especially
Euthymius Zigabenus, Dogmatic Panoply, p25; reprinted and translated in Janet
Hamilton and Bemard Hamilton, Christian Dualist Heresies in the Byzantine World
c.650-c.1405, (Manchester, 1998) p194.
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One presumes that Njegos also follows the rule established by
Milton that the true speak truth and the false speak falsely,l
although the essential falsehood of Satan's speeches are never
demonstrated by either poet apart from the fact that his speeches
lead him to destruction and hence must be fallible. This ambiguity
makes for certain difficulties, since in both poems Satan makes
'revelations' which undermine the legitimacy of God's rule. Now,
while criticism of God is necessary to Milton's theodical purpose, it
is never fully resolved for God is not given the right of reply or
clarification. Milton's ambiguity (or perhaps, more correctly, his
silence) forms the basis of the thesis, first argued by Shelley and
more recently by William Empson, that Milton's God is a forceful
usurping tyrant who places Satan in an unbearable situation since
he, God, whom [Satan's] reason hath equaled, [his own bullying]
force hath made supreme above his equals.2
Satan argues that in Hell he and his angels (now demons) have
perished 'as far as gods and Heavenly essences can perish' and are
not really creatures since 'we know no time when we were not as
now'.3 So, with no evidence of creation, it is thus only logical to
assume that angels are 'self-begot [and] self-raised by our own
quickening power'.4 If they can fight God for one day, then 'why
not eternal days?'5: God cannot defeat them, meaning that he is
now 'fallible, it seems, of future we must deem him, though till now
omniscient thought'6 and a fallible God is, of course, not God at all.
Satan seeks to claim his 'just inheritance of 0Id';7 that is: from the
time before God overthrew a more democratic order based on
'reason' so as to impose his own tyrannical rule. At times, God's
own words even seem to affirm Satan's accusations. He says of
Satan that, 'no bounds prescribed, no bars of Hell, nor all the chains
heaped on him there, nor yet the main Abyss wide interrupt, can
hold [him]' ,8 and, moreover, he fears 'lest unawares we lost this our
high place, our Sanctuary, our Hill'9 thus implying that not even
1 William Empson, Milton's God, (Cambridge, 1981) p22.
2 John Milton, Paradise Lost, 1.248-249, A. W. Verity (ed.), vol. 1, (Cambridge,
1934) P16; my italics.
3lbid, 1.138-139; pt3.
4lbid, V.859-861; p159.
5 [bid, VI.424; p176.
6lbid, VI.428-430; p176.
7lbid, 11.38; p38.
8lbid, 111.81-84; p75.
9 [bid, V.731"-732; p155.
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God himself regards his 'high place', his sovereignty, as his natural
right, but instead sees it as tenuous and as something that has to be
tenaciously fought for and maintained.
Shelley considered that in alleging 'no superiority of moral
virtue to his God over his Devil', Milton had violated the 'popular
creed' ,1 although C. S. Lewis dryly noted that the 'truth and
passion' of Milton's account 'were never, in essence, assailed till
pride and rebellion came, in the romantic age, to be admired for
their own sake'.2
The question for us then is whether Njegos's reading of Milton
comes closer to that of Shelley or Lewis. Njegos certainly knew of
the Romantic movement through the works of Hugo, Lamartine and
Byron,3 and it is not improbable that he had access to Shelley. A
revealing passage from Stephen the Small suggests that Njegos, in
keeping with more Romantic ideals, admired rebellion, whatever its
cost.
All in vain, if we were burning candle,
Still we never could be any other
Toward the foe of our true faith and freedom,
Let us rather strike the foe of freedom,
While there still is breath in any of us,
Who shall die, in glory shall he perish.4
Here, the warriors are fighting with God against tyranny, and for
their nation, but it takes only a little imaginative empathy to move
from Stephen's to Satan's position.
The history of Montenegro is that of the struggle for freedom
against Turkish rule, just as Satan struggles, in Njegos's particularly
revealing turn of phrase, 'to enjoy the gift of equal rights'.5
,Certainly, Njegos portrays Satan as a monarch6 whose reign is a real
threat to God's.7 Satan claims to be uncreated - merely woken
'from everlasting sleep'8 - so as to fight for the restoration of a
1 Percy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound; quoted in Empson, op cit, p16.
2 C. S. Lewis, A Preface to Paradise Lost (1942); quoted in Empson, op cit, p19.
3 Savic-Rebac, op cit, pp132-3.
4 Njegos, Stephen the Small; as quoted in Djilas, op cU, p385.
5 Njegos, op cit, IV.1095, p180; my italics.
6 [bid, 1.424-429, P162.
7 [bid, 111.775-77, p172.
8 [bid, IV.1 069-1 070, P180.
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time when 'on every throne there sat a crowned prince'.1 God is
pictured as weak in Njegos; we hear that the 'gloomy powers' once
ruled everything except 'the sacred mount sublime',2 and God at
one point admits to his ignorance of Satan's future decisions3 -
although as this expressed ignorance is a poetic device also used in
Biblical texts,4 one can excuse Njegos here.
Arguing this tenuous thesis for an affinity between Njegos and
Shelley, however, requires the assumption that Njegos admired
Satan, accepted the coherence of the accusations he levels against
God in Paradise Lost, and, as a result, then made him the hero of his
Luc"a. However, in the light of Satan's eternal punishment,S and the
endless praises addressed to God,6 this would seem unlikely.
Religious and Ethical Dualism
Njegos's philosophical system goes far beyond even that of
Milton's Satan, suggesting that Milton is not the source of Njegos's
dualism, although closer inspection reveals the similarities to be
more than may appear at first glance. Both deny an ex nihilo
creation, presenting God as a creator (Milton noted that the verb 'to
create' implies 'to make of something'7) who fashioned the world
out of formless primal matter,8 which was ethically neutra1.9 Instead,
both assume creation to be ex deo: Njegos's God 'extends' himself
as he creates,IO claiming that 'Myself am through myself, and
nothing else can ever itself alone exist';11 and Milton's God
1 [bid, IV.1110, p18!.
2lbid, 111.785-791, p172.
3 [bid, V.1339-1343, p187.
4 See, for example, Jeremiah 3:7, 19.
5 Njegos, op cit, 111.1006-1010, V.1600-1609, pp178, 194.
6 [bid, 111.760-767, 843-850, VI.1828-1845, pp171, 173-4, 200.
7 Milton, De Doctrina, pp305-6; as quoted in Danielson, op cit, p39.
8 Milton, Paradise Lost, 111.708, V.472-3 pp94, 147; Njegos, op cit, IV.I041,
VI.1763-1775, pp179, 194, 198.
9 On the ethical neutrality of Milton's prime matter, see Danielson, op cit, pp40-
41. The ethical neutrality of primal matter in Njegos is disputed among Slavicists,
although in light of Njegos's general conception of the nature of evil, discussed
below, the argument of Djilas and Zika Rad. Prvulovic that matter in itself is not
evil seems fairly certain; see Zika Rad. Prvulovic, 'Njegos on the Origin of Evil'
Seer, 32, 1954, p4; Djilas, op cif, p293.
10 Njegos, op cit, 111.807-808, ppI72-3.
I1 [bid, 111.852-853, p174.
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'produced all things not out of nothing but out of himself'. 1 This
position requires Milton to posit an origin of evil outside of all
created things, which come from God; and as he cannot claim that
evil came from God, Milton is forced to limit God, who declares:
Within appointed bounds be Heaven and Earth;
Boundless the Deep, because I am who fill
Infinitude; nor vacuous the space,
And put not forth my goodness, which is free
To act or oot.2
Dennis Danielson summarizes the situation thus:
to allow the seeds of good to grow and bear fruit beyond
himself, God had first to make a 'beyond'. Moreover, if all this
is conceived spatially, and if the 'beyond' is not to be
surrounded by God, then it, like God, will be infinite. As God is
its origin, however, no dualism follows. 3
Njegos's 'gloom' is also separate from God, and is a product of
events outside of his control, but, as shall be shown below, this does
not require dualism per se (the negative connotations of which
involve the product of sin occurring in time).
Satan 'produced the spirit and the name of evil',4 but not the
bare fact of 'gloom', which has existed since the cataclysm that
'destroyed the greatness of primeval heavens'.5 Presuming the
historicity of the cataclysm described by Satan, any dualism here is
mitigated at best,6 as God pre-dates the cataclysmic event that
produced the 'gloom'. Satan is the author of evil in Milton, and in
Njegos he transforms the singular undivided 'gloom' into a
plurality of agents in active opposition to God. Milton's Satan
begets Sin and Death,7 whereas Njegos's Devil has merely 'put on
1 Milton, De Doctrina, p310; quoted in Danielson, op cit, p43.
2 Milton, Paradise Lost, VII. 168-172, P198.
3 Danielson, op cit, p48.
4 Njegos, op cit, 111.929, p176
5lbid, IV.1112, p18!.
6 For classifications of religious dualism, see Yuri Stoyanov, The Other God:
Dualist Religions from Antiquity to the Cathar Heresy, (New Haven and London,
2000) pp4-5.
7 Milton, Paradise Lost, 11.749-789, pp 60-1.
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Black garments' ,1 thus subordinating himself to the dictates of the
flesh. 2 Rather than begetting gloom, 'Satan's injustice has led out
the black and evil world into the upper air'.3 Anica Savic-Rebac
has argued that this 'emanatism' is a distinctive feature of
Bogomilism, from which she believes Njegos derived the idea, 4 but
Njegos could just have easily arrived at this position himself
reacting to nothing more than Milton's monism. When examining
the co-eternity of evil, it must be remembered that neither poet's
devil is completely evil: Milton's devil has initial misgivings5 and is
almost melted by Eve's beauty, 6 while Njegos's Satan at least has
sensibilities regarding a kind of quasi-nationalistic 'honour'.7
Evil, sin, death, and chaos in Milton are a result of disobedience.
Raphael cautions prelapsarian man that 'God made thee perfect, not
immutable'.8 Sin is the result of a conscious, free decision to
disobey God.9 Milton specifies that Adam ate 'against his better
knowledge, not deceiv'd'.IO Sin usually occurs in the intellectual
realm; only Eve is prompted to sin by her sensual nature. 11 Duality
in Milton exists initially between God and his creation, or between
1 Njegos, op cit, 111.922-923, P176. This makes for some interesting
resemblances with the Zurvanite devil, Ahriman who received a cloak that 'hath the
very substance of A4z [that is: of evil]' (Selections of Zitsprarn, 34.35, text Z 5
(a); in R. C. Zaehner, Zurvan: A Zoroastrian Dilemma, (New York, 1972, p351).
Such a connection is not as tenuous as it may at first sound. Francis Dvomik makes·
a convincing case for the Iranian origins of many Slavic religious ideas, and
Dragomanov demonstrates that Zurvanite ideas spread at least among the Kurds, if
not further west; see Francis Dvornik, The Slavs: Their Early History and
Civilization, Survey of Slavic Civilization, vol. 2, (Boston, 1959) pp47-9 and M.
P. Dragomanov, Notes on the Slavic Religio-Ethical Legends: The Dualistic
Creation of the World, trans. Earl W. Count, Russia and East European Series, vol.
23, (The Hague, 1961) pp52-6.
2 Njegos, op cit, Ill.947, p176.
3 [bid, V.1369-1370, p188.
4 Savic-Rebac, op cit, pp126-7.
5 Milton, Paradise Lost, 1.126, IV.42-113, p13, 100-102.
6lbid, IV.388-392, pIll.
7 Njegos, op cit, V.1268, p185.
8 Milton, Paradise Lost, V.524, p149.
9 Vincent P. di Benedetto, 'Scripture's Constraint and Adam's Self-Authoring
Freedom: A Reading of the Fall in Paradise Lost, ' Milton Quarterly, 25 (1), 1991,
p3. In relation to Milton, Paradise Lost, 11.749-761, p60.
10 Milton, Paradise Lost, IX.998, p267.
11 [bid, IX.784-793, p261.
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God and the 'Deep' where 'God's goodness is not', and it is not
until the Fall that, in R.A. Shoaf's words, the 'original dual with
God was changed into a duel with God') Prior to Christ's action in
casting Satan into the 'Deep' ,2 this region was completely neutral in
ethical terms. Milton may 'conceive of an absolute darkness and an
absolute light,3 as Beverley Sherry suggests, but prior to the fall it
was a duality completely under the control of the God who
'separated the light from the darkness'.4 Like Njegos's 'gloom',
this 'Deep' only gained negative connotations once it became
Satan's resting-place from which he vowed to forever oppose God.5
In Njegos, the angelic Adam and his host are described as
having, even prior to the Fall, a 'credulous inconstant will and
mind' which erodes their freewill, thus rendering their faculties
incapable of choosing between good and evi1.6 In Eastern Orthodox
Christianity, angels, and prelapsarian humans subsist in the grace of
God, their freedom lying in 'the power either to abide or to
progress in goodness, or to turn towards evil'.7 But with his Western
European understanding of human nature and will, Milton rejected
this as determinist, arguing instead that 'good angels are upheld by
their own strength no less than man himself was before his fall'.8 As
a kind of compromise between these two positions, Njegos adopts
an accidental understanding of free will, but with a far more
pessimistic view of human reason than Milton. He sees reason as
fallen even prior to its being clothed in the 'garments of skin'9
which override reason by appealing to the 'fleshy' nature. Thus,
original sin, for Njegos, occurs in the noumenalrealm, and is
independent of matter, resulting as it does from a defect in angelic
reasoning.
Rather than begetting evil, as Milton's sin does, in Njegos' work
sin 'vivifies' - for want of a better word - the 'gloom', marshalling
1 R. A. Shoaf, Milton: Poet of Duality, (New Haven), p3.
2 Milton, Paradise Lost, VI.864-874, p189.
3 Personal communication (email) with Dr Beverley Sherry, 3/11/2001.
4 Genesis 1:4.
5 Milton, Paradise Lost, 1.159-165, p14.
6 Njegos, op cit, 111.971, pI77.
7 St. John of Damascus, Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 11; as quoted in
Mother Alexandra, op cit, p165.
8 Milton, De Doctrina, I.ix.98-99; quoted in West, op cit, p163.
9 Genesis 3:21. On the ramifications of being clothed in 'garments of skin, ' see
Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ: The Nature of the Human Person, trans.
Norman Russell, (Crestwood, New York, 1987) pp44-63.
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it in opposition to God,l and creating a dualism that is anti-cosmic,
but which does not pre-suppose matter to be evil purely in and of
itself. Following the original cataclysm, matter existed in stasis, or as
Njegos puts it, 'in heavy sleep under the clouds of chaos, buried in
the depth of gloom'.2 Its motion was 'senseless'3 in much the same
way that movement in Dante's Inferno is.4 Matter was merely
'atoms only without form or aim, that neither name nor motion
knew till then, nothing but frigid sleep and silence dead' ,5 and, as
such, simply remained in a state of unmanifest potentiality which
God could re-form and illuminate.6 Were matter itself evil, as some
accounts of Njegos suggest,7 then it would clearly not praise God
and welcome his victory over Satan as it does.8
Satan's great lie was that matter could 'be' by itself, that it had
any value apart from the noumenal which could only come from
God.9 For creative activity apart from God can only result in 'dead
and woeful shapes' 10 that are more transitory than real. Satan put
matter on as a cloak and led it out, subjecting himself to its dictates.
Evil, according to the Greek Fathers, results from an imbalance
between the noumenal and the phenomenal, which leads to a
dependence upon, and hence a state of being controlled by, the
physical realm. It This is the paradigm through which Njegos
explains the quandary in which humanity finds itself. When
banishing Adam to earthly bondage, ironically trapping him in the
very 'oozy chains of earthly bodies'12 that Adam had himself
coveted, God decrees that
On both sides
The tablet of his soul shall be engraved
1 Njegos, op cit, V.1369-1370, p188.
2 [bid, 111.779-780, p172, cf. 111.820, IV. 1069-1076, 1159, pp173, 180, 182.
3 [bid, 111.794, P172.
4 Christopher Ryan, 'The Theology of Dante, ' in Rachel Jacoff (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Dante, (Cambridge, 1993) pp143, 147.
5 Njegos, op cit, V.1526-1528, p192.
6/bid, 1.414-420, 111.773-780, IV.I041-1043, pp162, 172, 179.
7 See for example some conceptions cited by Djilas, op cit, p293.
8 Njegos, op cit, 11.608-610, V.1526-1534, pp167, 192.
9 [bid, 1.250-252, 111.852-853, pp158, 174.
10 [bid, 111.805, p172.
11 John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trend and Doctrinal Themes,
(New York, 1987) p135.
12 Njegos, op cit, VI. 1646-1647, p195.
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With two commandments of contrasting laws:
On one in sacred lines the mild command
Of justice, on the other side the mark
Of the seducer, drawn in features black,
The hellish token of Satanic bond. 1
To escape 'the embrace of the dark power'2 is clearly the goal of
mankind in the Luc~a, and the Incarnation provides the means to do
so: Christ came to 'illuminate with the immortal law of sacred
justice their obscured mind',3 so that humanity could transcend its
bondage within the flesh and return to the immortal light. A rare
passage in Paradise Lost has Raphael arguing this same outcome:
Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit,
Improv'd by tract of time, and wing'd ascend
Ethereal, as we...4
However, bearing in mind Milton's well-known emphasis on the
essential unity of body and soul,5 it is difficult to know what to
make of this passage.
Dualism is incompatible with orthodox understandings of the
Incarnation, which suggest that God is so like man that he became
man.6 For the sake of logical consistency, Njegos's Christ must be
Apollinarian; he is simply the 'beloved Word, arrayed in cloth of
human flesh'.7 Thus, the origins of this dualistic (in the spirit/flesh
sense) of Njegos's soteriology can more easily be traced to Eastern
sources such as Plato and Origen; it is clearly not derived from this
single exceptional instance of Milton's suggestion that 'Your
bodies may at last turn all to spirit'.
Pre-Existence and Rays of Flame Immortal
1 [bid, VI.1689-161694, p196. cf. 1.76-82, p153.
2lbid, 1.237, p157. '
3 lbid, VI.1732-1733, P197.
4 Milton, Paradise Lost, V.497-499, p148.
5 Milton, De Doctrina, 1.7; quoted in' Shoaf, op cit, p3.
6 R.A Shoaf, op cit, p7.
7 Njegos, op cit, VI.1729-1730, p197. On Apollinarianism, see Harold O. J.
Brown, Heresies: Heresy and Orthodoxy in the History of the Church, Hendirckson
Publishers (Peabody, Mass. 1988) pp163-5.
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The central difference between Njegos and Milton lies in Njegos's
conception of pre-existence which provides him with the framework
for speaking of the 'two commandments', or, as Dubbink suggests,
the two 'minds', um and hitrost, the former being the philosophical
mind and the latter 'the mind of men living in the world'.1 This
idea found its earliest expression in the modem period in Henry
More's The Immortality of the Soule (1659),2 although there is no
evidence that Njegos was aware of any of the work of the
Cambridge Platonists. Amongst his relative contemporaries, though,
ideas about pre-existence were held by the German poet Friedrich
Klopstock (1724-1803),3 and the Russian theosophist Vladimir
Odoevsky (1803-1869) also taught similar doctrines regarding free
human spirits being trapped in matter as a consequence of the Fall.4
At least as significant is the discovery of a copy of Dumont
d'Urville's voyages in Njegos's library, which contains Eastern
teachings on pre-existence and the physical world as
'punishment' .5
Njegos had a penchant for ancient authorities, however, so it is
likely that he may have looked to Plato and other Orphic myths for
these ideas, which permeate his poem completely. Certain Orphic
myths contain the concept of a pre-Creation cataclysm,6 which is
absent from most other literature aside from some obscure
speculation on Genesis 1:2.7 A number of Platonic texts also
1 1. H. Dubbink, 'Some Contributions to a Future Commentary on the Luca
Mikrokosma of P. P. Njegos, ' Dutch Contributions to the Fifth International
Congress of Slavicists, (Sofia, 1963) p22.
2 Robert H.West, op cit, p84.
3 Djilas, op cit, p269.
4 Andrezj Walicki, A History of Russian Thought From the Enlightenment to
Marxism, (Stanford, 1979) p78.
5 Djilas, op cit, p269.
6 The textual sources for myths containing this motif are Euripides' Melanippe,
Apollonios Rhodios' Argonautica (1.496-511) and the Rhapsodic Theogony. Larry
J Alderink, Creation and Salvation in Ancient Orphism, (Chico, California, 1981)
pp38, 42. Following Savic-Rebac, op cit, pp 124-5, it is likely that Njegos used
Orphic ideas that came to him through non-literary avenues, however.
7 An alternative translation of this text is 'now the earth became formless and
void' which could give rise to speculation of a pre-creation cataclysm, but this
would seem too insufficient to be counted as a likely source considering how well-
developed the concept is in Njegos.
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contain the idea of the body as a 'tomb' or 'prison' of the soul,1
but as this image is also found in Dante and Hugo,2 one wonders
how important Plato was for Njegos. However, later than Plato, and
probably more important for Njegos, was Origen, in whom many of
these ideas were united. Origen taught the successive destruction of
previous worlds,3 the pre-existence and transmigration of souls,4 the
final salvation of all spirits,5 guardian angels,6 and creation ex deo;7
and his clarity and scope makes him an ideal source for Njegos,
who made use of a large number of his ideas.
The other important motif in Njegos which has no parallel in
Milton is that of the 'ray of flame immortal' ,8 which is the angelic
soul trapped in a human body, and which, in its transcendent form,
becomes Njegos's guide through the heavens. Javarek describes this
ray as simply being the human mind.9 However, the Ray refers to
itself as 'the bright idea' ,ID thus immediately evoking the
Zoroastrian image of Fravashi, which in one sense were the
departed souls of heroes, able to assist the living, and in another
sense were the heavenly 'ideas' of things on earth, recalling the
notion of Platonic forms. I I Dante describes Beatrice too as being
'like a ray'12 which draws him toward heaven, and which emanates
from God.!3 Similar images are also contained in pseudo-
Dionysius,14 Sarajlija's poetry,15 and Mani's Kephalaia,16 so it is
1 Plato, Cratylus, 400c; Gorgias, 493a; Phaedo 62b quoted in Alderink, op cit,
pp60-2.
2 Savic-Rebac, op cit, p122. cf. Dante, op cit, IV.49-56, pp44-45.
3 Origen, Origen on First Principles, 11.3.1-7, trans. G. W. Butterworth, (New
York, 1966) pp82-94.
4/bid, 1.4.1, 11.8.1-3, pp40, 120-127.
5/bid, 11.10.5-8, pp 142-6. Compare to Njegos, op cit, 111.809-810-836, p173;
which is possibly denied by 111.1008-1010, p178.
6 Origen, op cit, 1.5.1, p42. Compare to Njegos, op cit, 1.335-338, p160.
7 Origen, op cit, 11.1.4, p80.
8 Njegos, op cit, 1.215-216, p157.
9 Javarek, op cit, p524.
ID Njegos, op cit, 1.261, p158.
11 Mary Boyce, A History of Zoroastrianism: The Early Period, vo!. 1, (Leiden,
1989 revised edition) ppI18-29.
12 Dante, op cit, 1.51, p3.
13 [bid, VII.70-78, p84.
14 Mother Alexandra, op cit, ppI57-8.
15 Djilas, op cit, p271.
16 Savic-Rebac, op cit, p130.
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impossible to highlight a single source as Njegos's primary
inspiration for this concept.
One notable element of the Ray's role that is missing from these
sources, however, is that it is through the Ray 'that thou
rememberest still what thou hast 10st',1 which is a notion that
strongly recalls the figure of the spirit guide in the Cathar text Liber
supra Stella. 2 Savic-Rebac supposes that Njegos might have learnt
about Bogomil ideas - and presumably Cathar doctrines as well -
from the German scholar Kopitar, with whom he spent two months
in 1844,3 but the connection remains speculative at best.
Connected with the Ray is the question of Njegos's idealism.
Both Djilas and Prvulovic label Njegos an 'idealist',4 although
Djilas concludes that Njegos could not have had any contact with
modem philosophy, for he proceeded from inspirations and myths
and, of course, his own personal experiences, and not from the
attainments of scholarship.5
Dubbink agrees that Njegos draws upon idealist concepts, but
argues that 'Njegos, in his solitude and illness, experiences the
physical world in which he had to play a role for his country as the
most real thing',6 rather than considering the ideal as being more
real than the physical, as Plato, for instance, did. However, while
Njegos's pessimism may indeed dwell on the physical rather than
the spiritual, nonetheless God's action in depriving 'belling Adam
and his legion of every thought of their celestial home, the slightest
shadow of that memory',7 would seem to indicate that Njegos does
conceive of an ideal (and, what's more, originary) realm that he
cannot see, even when experience belies that fact.
A comparison with Milton reveals just how strongly Njegos was
in fact influenced by Kantian idealism. Milton's narrative occurs on
earth, with constant references to the phenomenological world.
Knowledge is always empirical, and salvation occurs in and through
the body; in short, Milton is a materialist.8 Njegos's poem, however,
1 Njegos, op cit, 1.216, p157.
2 Savic-Rebac, op cit, p130.
3 [bid, p126.
4 Djilas, op cif, p293; Prvulovic, 'Dialectical Idealism, , p64.
5 Djilas, op cit, p293.
6 Dubbink, op cit, p24.
7 Njegos, op cit, VI.1638-1641, p195; my italics for emphasis.
8 Savic-Rebac, op cit, p123.
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is situated almost exclusively in heaven,l and salvation occurs by
following 'the immortal law of sacred justice'.2 Compare this to
Kant's conviction that
the essence of things is not changed by their external relations ...
[and] morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the
will, Le., to possible universal lawgiving by maxims of the wil1.3
For Milton, as for Dante, justice comes from God alone,4 while for
an idealist such as Njegos, there exists an 'ontological concept of
perfection' not derived from any divine will.5 Njegos happily
accepts the latter alternative, proclaiming 'sacred are eternal laws, all
beings obey them'.6
Conclusion
Milton's epic is a crucial expository tool for Njegos's Luca, not just
because of their similarities, but- also because the ways in which
Njegos reacts against Milton - or unintentionally differs from him -
often reveal surprising and unexpected influences, preoccupations
and stylistic idiosyncrasies that might otherwise be ignored.
Comparing Njegos's dichotomy between the physical and
intellectual worlds with Milton's conception, for example,
demonstrates that Njegos's system is primarily a product of his own
philosophical speculation, and does not fit neatly into any existing
religious system, dualist, monotheistic or monist. Taken together,
their presentations of the dark side reveal its enduring nature in the
religious imagination of both the Western European and Eastern
Orthodox Church, as well as exemplifying the recurrent difficulties
faced by Christian poets attempting to empathize with the Satanic
forces whilst still maintaining the absolute sovereignty of God.
1 Only VI.1776-1845 are situated on earth.
2 Njegos, op cit, VI.1731-2, p197.
3 Immanuel Kant, 'Foundations on the Metaphysics of Morals', IV.439, in
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy,
trans. and ed. L. W. Beck, (Chicago, 1949) p96.
4 Empson, op cit, 22; Dante, op cit, XIX.86-90, pp227-8.
5 Immanuel Kant, 'Foundations', IV.442, p99.
6 Njegos, op cit, 1.474-475, p164.
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